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Accidents
Have I not walked without an upward look
Of caution under stars that very well
Might not have missed me when they shot and fell?
It was a risk I had to take—and took.
		
—Robert Frost, Bravado
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N

o two seasons are ever the same in the White Mountains.
The weather varies and the people change. Although common threads
may weave through the hiking incidents in the White Mountains, many
twists in the details make it impossible to predict them to any meaningful
degree. The winter of 2010 to 2011 proved typically unusual. During the first
half of the season, very few accidents required search and rescue. In fact, the
U.S. Forest Service snow rangers were not called to manage a single incident
on Mount Washington until mid-March. Snowfall accumulation was below
average most months, but regular small snows and the lack of a pronounced
January thaw kept snow on the ground for most of the winter.
These accumulated small storms apparently snuck up on recreationists,
who encountered an unusually large number of avalanches. Avalanches come
every year—more than 100 of them on the east side of Mount Washington—
but they rarely involve people. In the first few months of 2011, nine avalanches
caught nineteen skiers, snowboarders, or technical climbers. Amazingly, only
one of them was hurt. Most of the avalanches hit while the people were
ascending, so the afflicted could just as easily have been hikers or snowshoers.
With all of the electronics now carried around the backcountry, it was no surprise that photos and videos documented a number of these incidents. One
unreported avalanche swept over skiers who were standing on the floor of
Tuckerman Ravine below large slopes rated with high avalanche danger. One
member of the party was wearing a helmet-cam, and the Mount Washington
Avalanche Center learned of the accident several days later when a video had
been posted on YouTube. Another narrow miss occurred in the Gulf of Slides
when a naturally triggered avalanche buried a site where two men had just
removed their tent. These two incidents stress the importance of being able
to recognize avalanche terrain, including the lower-angle slopes that serve as
“runout zones” for the slides.
Always predictable is the dedication of many volunteers. The New
England K-9 Team marked 30 years in 2011. The all-volunteer team
was involved in 30 separate searches in 2010. The year 2011 was also the
25th anniversary of the New Hampshire Outdoor Council, a nonprofit
organization that acts as a funnel point for donations and then disperses
funds to the various rescue teams through grant programs. The NHOC also
A U.S. Forest Service helicopter searches for a missing snowboarder near Boott Spur in
spring 2011 after he climbed above Tuckerman Ravine in the clouds and then mistakenly
descended the wrong side of the mountain. The USFS, working with New Hampshire
Fish and Game, found him in the Dry River Wilderness. JUSTIN PREISENDORFER
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supports education and awareness campaigns and was a critical partner in the
development of the hikeSafe responsibility code (www.hikesafe.com).

Shackled by Ice
Winter seemed to return to the White Mountains in time for 2010 trickor-treating. Costumed children wore down jackets in Gorham and North
Conway as they went door to door, and for the better part of a week, temperatures on the summit of Mount Washington stayed below their long-term
average. Light but steady snow accompanied the last few days of October,
and it appeared as though the fall hiking season had come to an end. Such
was not the case, however. Before long, rain fell all the way to the summits
and temperatures rose again. Even through Thanksgiving, most summits were
bare of snow, and the month wrapped up with less than half the customary snowfall. Temperatures averaged a couple degrees warmer than normal
throughout November.
Then, on November 27, the mercury plummeted. It was the Saturday
following Thanksgiving, and James A., age 51, got a late start for his hike up
5,367-foot Mount Madison. There was no snow at the trailhead, but the air
was bitter and the summits stayed in the single digits for the entire day. The
daily summit weather report from the Mount Washington Observatory read,
“Fog will continue and upslope snow showers will return to the summits.
Winds will be increasing as the low passes, generating ground blizzards by
the afternoon as all the newly fallen snow is whipped about.” It was at about
11 a.m. when James left the Appalachia trailhead and began his walk.
James reached Madison Spring Hut at 2 p.m. amid light snow flurries
and assessed the seemingly short 1-mile round-trip hike to the summit of
Mount Madison. Sunset was at 5:15 p.m., which meant that if he made it to
the summit in the hour that he expected, he would be back down below treeline before darkness fell. Feeling fine with this safety margin, James climbed
toward the summit. While he was high on the summit cone, the weather
system’s low passed overhead, the wind picked up, and a snow squall engulfed
James’s surroundings. He struggled to follow the line of cairns in the limited
visibility and turned to his global positioning system unit. Unfortunately, the
cold temperatures caused the electronics to malfunction. James carried no
regular compass and didn’t stop to take his map out of his pack.
As he navigated through darkening skies and blowing snow, he lost the
trail. He eventually realized that he had veered northeast of the hut and was in
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the top reaches of Snyder Brook. The Valley Way parallels the brook, and James
knew that he needed only to cross the brook and begin climbing up the steep
slope on the other side. One, two, maybe three hundred feet, and he’d surely
hit the trail. As James shuffled across the brook, the snow-covered ice gave
way, and he quickly found himself up to his chest in an icy mountain stream.
He clawed his way out and onto shore, where he realized the magnitude of
the situation and reached for his cell phone. No service. He walked down
the brook bank cautiously. James was chilled and his soaking wet pants kept
falling down. In blowing snow, he stood with his pants around his ankles,
cell phone in hand trying to let someone know of his predicament. His pants
became frozen around his ankles, and he realized that he carried no knife to
cut them off. His phone picked up a hint of a signal, and James made a 911
call. When he was finally connected to a 911 operator and New Hampshire
Fish and Game conservation officer, he wasn’t very hopeful, telling them “I’m
not going to make it.”
Conservation officer Matt Holmes knew from the story and James’s attitude that time was of the essence. He quickly put in a call to Androscoggin
Valley Search and Rescue knowing that many of the team’s members live in
the town of Randolph where James was then standing. A team of rescuers
was soon assembled and on the Valley Way. Veteran AVSAR members Paul
Cormier and Mike Pelchat located James around 4,400 feet not far from
the trail, but he was moderately hypothermic and still had his pants frozen
like shackles around his ankles. The rescuers stripped him of his clothes, got
him into dry layers, and fed him warm liquids and food. Before long, he was
able to walk out under his own power, and he refused medical care when he
reached the trailhead.
Comment: Calculated risk is what we take every day when we drive to
work or take a leisurely walk through the woods. There is always a chance
that calamity may fall upon us, and we live our lives making decisions, some
conscious some otherwise, on our odds of survival. James was an experienced
hiker, and he was able to make decisions on a solid foundation of knowledge.
Leaving the trailhead at 11 a.m. is far too late a start for many hikers during
the short days of late November, but James was confident in his abilities.
When he sat at the hut contemplating the ascent above treeline, he realized
he had a smaller margin of safety—exposed environment, cold temperatures,
moderate winds, forecasted ground blizzards, limited time before darkness,
few if any people around, and so forth. He decided on a level of acceptable
risk with which many readers would not feel comfortable. If he broke a leg
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near the summit, he’d be stuck above treeline in deteriorating conditions at a
time when most people would be back at their cars. His calamity insurance
was the gear in his pack, the skills and experience he had acquired during
previous adventures, and the fight in his soul. Although many would have
turned around at the hut, I don’t think that James’s decision to push for the
summit was inappropriate if he had the equipment and confidence to navigate a portion of his descent in the dark. It had taken him three and a half
hours to make it to the hut, and had he turned around there, he would have
reached his car right around dusk. Instead, he chose to push on without the
proper equipment.
Just as the observatory had predicted, when the low passed through the
area, it kicked off upslope snow showers that were whipped into ground blizzards by increasing winds. The weather that James encountered was exactly
what was forecasted; however, it arrived with noteworthy intensity. I was paddling a canoe down the Androscoggin River on a duck-hunting adventure
when I encountered the low. Two of my brothers were in another canoe 100
feet away but I lost sight of them in a flash. Next thing I knew I was floating
next to Route 16, where a truck had pulled over because the visibility was so
poor. The driver, a small old man, jumped out when he saw me and yelled
something about having to use a shovel to bail out my boat. In a 15-minute
window, three inches of snow piled up on the canoe floor. Other folks who
were outdoors when the low passed had similarly entertaining stories about
the wall of white.
When visibility shuts down or you suddenly find yourself disoriented, the
most important thing that you can do is to stop and relax. Retracing your
steps is much easier to do when you’re calm and collected. The same goes
for navigating via GPS or map and compass. The idea behind cairns as trail
markers is to establish a string of points usually no more than 150 feet apart
that can confirm that you’re on the trail. From one cairn, you strike out to
locate the next. If you cannot find it, you retreat and try again. This can be
done systematically with a compass by following a series of bearings that are
5 degrees apart. If you do not reach a cairn within a certain distance, you follow a back bearing (original bearing plus 180) to the point of origin, realign
yourself 5 degrees off the original bearing, and repeat the process. If there are
multiple people in a party, you can also align the group and make a sweeping
arc through the area, making sure that all members can see either the cairn or
the person on their cairn side. Climbing parties can also use their rope (usu-
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ally 150–200 feet) to position one person at the cairn while the other does a
sweep of the area within a rope’s length.
Although GPS technology is absolutely wonderful, there is no substitute
for a good old-fashioned map and compass. GPS units have gotten much
better over the last decade, but like all electronics, they begin to struggle
when temperatures dip toward 0 degrees F. The most common problems are
dramatic decreases in battery life and poor screen performance. The map and
compass should come along no matter what, but do the following also: place
high-quality, fresh batteries in your GPS unit and also carry an extra set, best
kept warm in an inside pocket to give more power when you need them.
Keep your GPS tucked inside your jacket; it might periodically lose satellite
reception, but the batteries will stay happy, and the liquid crystal display will
stay just that, liquid. As an alternative, you can keep the unit inside the lid of
your pack with chemical hand warmers taped around it. You can also store
batteries inside the insulated sleeve or “koozie” that you use to keep a water
bottle of tea warm.
Falling through ice and into frigid water is probably one of the most frightening experiences, whether it happens within sight of your house or three
miles into the backcountry. The critical step to survival if you do fall through
is getting yourself out of the water and onto solid ground. To do this you’ll
need to stay calm, try to crawl or swim out onto the ice that had previously
supported you, and roll away from the hole in the direction from which you
approached. Once out, getting dry and warm is the order of business. James
might have been able to get a fire going if he had the proper tools to do so,
but he brought one lighter and it had gotten wet. Or he might have changed
into a dry set of clothes if he carried them inside a waterproof bag within
his pack. A knife would have been handy to cut off the frozen pants and at
least give James the ability to do jumping jacks or something else to generate
body heat.
James was quick to speak to the media about his ordeal, and his selfmade videos graced the 6 o’clock news. His 911 call also received airtime as
he stated, “I’m not going to make it.” Officer Holmes replied, “Jim, hang
in there. It (has) a lot to do with your mindset. You need to put your mind
to the fact that you’re going to make it.” Holmes was exactly right. When
adversity strikes is no time to be a pessimist. The organization that we know
today as Outward Bound evolved partly as a way to train young British sailors
with skills and the mindset to survive. Laurence Gonzales’s excellent book
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Deep Survival: Who Lives, Who Dies, and Why (Norton, 2003) argues that
attitude is the greatest factor in determining who survives. Gonzales combines scientific research with amazing stories of survival from plane crashes,
capsized boats, and lost hikers.
The confidence that helped James get into trouble was the same factor that
helped keep him alive as rescuers raced up the trail. It just took some coaching
from Officer Holmes. Rescuers Cormier and Pelchat are no slouches when
it comes to hustling along a trail, but you can bet they were making extra
time when they heard they were responding to a soaked solo hiker stranded
just below treeline. Their quick response made all the difference as the temperature soon dipped below zero, and even the strongest willed would have
likely succumbed to the elements. James had boundless praise for the volunteers when he reached the trailhead. He told the media that some additional
equipment could have improved his situation. He was lucky that he was
unscathed and all he lost was his wallet, which had been left where he had
fallen into the water. Later that same week James received his wallet in the
mail. Cormier, who had heard that James left it behind, had returned to the
accident site, found it, and sent it to him.

Facebook and False Alarms
In the Winter/Spring 2011 issue, I mentioned the rising use of what are commonly known as PLBs, or personal locator beacons. During the winter of
2010–2011, the trend continued. More and more mountain travelers are carrying some sort of PLB-type device that will send distress messages via satellite
connection. The U.S. Forest Service has also realized the value of the technology and recently began experimenting with their use for a handful of field
staff who work alone in remote off-trail locations. The satellite-based personal
messenger known as the SPOT device is one of the most common and has
multiple functions. Where expensive digital radios or smartphones fail to get
a message out, the SPOT can be counted on to let the outside world know
that you’re in trouble—or OK, or maybe even just at the summit snack bar
having a chili dog with Marty the cat. As the technology associated with these
devices changes and becomes more complex, the potential for operator error
seems to be rising in sync.
	On December 23, 2010, Dave L., a local climbing guide, led a couple
of clients up Mount Washington’s Lion Head winter route. Dave was the
climbing school’s go-to guy for tech toys, and the school had given him a
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new GPS/satellite tracking device to test. It was agreed that he would use the
SPOT to notify the school along the way that all was going well. As Dave
headed up the mountain that day, he stopped occasionally and pushed a button that he thought was sending a preprogrammed message that said, simply,
“I am leaving now from here for a hike in the mountains.” Instead, the device
sent out a message to the prearranged contacts that said, “Need Assistance,
Notify MRS.” MRS is the Mountain Rescue Service, the White Mountains’
only search and rescue (SAR) team that specializes in technical and extreme
weather rescues. Worse, the button pushed was also set up to update Dave’s
Facebook page with the same message.
Within a short amount of time, the phones and radios of the USFS snow
rangers began ringing off the hook. Concerned friends and family had seen
the Facebook update. Rescuers from the USFS, the Appalachian Mountain
Club, and Harvard Mountaineering Club responded and began their ascents
of Lion Head. Meanwhile, a repeat of the same distress message came through.
This time it originated from higher up the mountain, which seemed odd
for a party in distress. Search coordinators began formulating ideas about
what was going on high on the mountain, but the forces pushed ahead just
in case the hunch was wrong. They informed the staff at the summit, and
everyone began looking for Dave and his two clients. They soon appeared at
the summit where they were quickly informed that the SPOT had actually
been sending a distress message and a rescue had been initiated.
Comment: The SPOT device has become one of the most commonly
carried PLB-type devices in the backcountry because of its ability to send
multiple types of messages. If you send the right one, it works well. One
preprogrammed message is equivalent to an “SOS,” and a second basically tells
loved ones that you’re fine but will be late. A third commonly used message
essentially confirms that all is well. The buttons can be reprogrammed to send
whatever message the operator would like. Dave visited the SPOT website
the night before the hike and changed the messages connected to his device.
Dave is a pretty tech-savvy guy, so when different messages were received
by his family and friends, he was convinced that there was an error on the
manufacturer/service provider’s end. After the incident, he immediately got
in touch with the maker, DeLorme, and began a dialogue.
After reviewing transmission logs and other technical reports, DeLorme
determined the cause of the confusion. Dave had gone to the SPOT website
and changed the prearranged messages, but he did not know that the device
needed to be synced for the change to actually occur. Without this crucial
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step, the old messages were still activated. The company pledged to investigate options that would prevent users from sending messages in the field
when a syncing operation is still needed.

A Trusty Wingman
On March 15, 2011, a group of friends made their way up to Tuckerman
Ravine and continued toward the summit, choosing Right Gully for its direct
approach and relatively moderate pitch (of about 30 to 35 degrees). It was
around 10 a.m., and surface conditions were mixed with lots of refrozen and
icy old snow peppered with pockets of powdery new snow. The group all
wore snowshoes and carried ski poles in their hands. Going up, one of the
top members slipped just below the mouth of Right Gully. He immediately
began sliding headfirst on the slick surface and was headed toward the Lunch
Rocks. David R., 27, of Montreal, Québec, was near the middle of the line
when his friend began to slide out of control. He began running in his snowshoes and jumped in his friend’s way to prevent him from smashing into the
boulders. In one of his final steps before blocking his friend, David broke his
lower left leg.
Witnessing this accident were the Harvard Cabin caretaker and three local
climbing guides who volunteer for the MRS. The four initiated a quick and
safe rescue, splinting David’s leg, then placing him on a litter, which they
slid down the riverbed to the top of the Little Headwall. USFS snow rangers
met them there to assist with a 300-foot technical rope lower down the steep,
snow- and ice-covered cascade. At the bottom of the steep pitch, David was
loaded into a sled and then towed by snowmobile down to Pinkham Notch
Visitor Center, meeting an ambulance.
Comment: This young man definitely gets the Wingman of 2011 award.
He had little winter hiking experience and had not spent time in steep, open,
snow-covered terrain. If he had, he might have thought better of what he did
to save his friend. Instead, he reacted valiantly. Despite that and the happierthan-it-could-have-been ending, there is a lesson here in the group’s decision
to wear snowshoes in steep terrain. Modern snowshoes are usually equipped
with a fairly aggressive crampon that provides good traction in low-angled
terrain. Such a set-up allows snowshoers to work their way up into some
pretty hairy terrain before they know it. The problem is that few snowshoers
carry the ice axes that are absolutely necessary when you travel through terrain
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where a sliding fall would quickly get out of control. The good news is that if
you fall, the snowshoe crampons are not nearly as aggressive as mountaineering
crampons, so you are less likely to catch a point and break your leg. The bad
news is that you’re likely to fall. Snowshoes often act like skis; they want to
schuss you down the slope. If you try to walk in an established boot ladder,
the snowshoe often prevents your foot and the crampon from engaging the
recessed step. Ask yourself, “What would happen if I slipped right now?” The
ultimate answer is that you ought to carry an ice ax to avoid those dangerous
slips and stop them from turning into sliding falls when they do occur.

Frozen SPOT
The first PLB-initiated incident of 2011 also occurred on Mount Washington
and involved a mountaineering guide. Unlike the event a few months earlier,
this accident on March 26 was not a false alarm. The guide, Joan V., 49, had
low expectations for the day when she reviewed the weather forecast. She had
been assigned two clients who wanted to summit New England’s highest peak
via the standard Lion Head winter route, but the forecast was daunting. New
snow had fallen, temperatures were below zero, and the winds were expected
to ramp up above the 60 miles per hour they’d reached. Following normal
practice, Joan checked the clients’ gear, informed them of the weather forecast, and suggested several options for the day, one of which was to stick to
their original plan. They wanted to attempt Mount Washington as planned.
Guides use landmarks on the route as goals while climbing. On a day like
this one, setting the summit as a goal was setting a high bar. She set lower
landmarks as destinations. Most folks have no problem getting to the start of
the Lion Head winter route even in the foulest of weather. From there, climbers face the technical crux of the route, where a steep rock step requires careful
movement with cramponed feet. Once climbers move past this section, they
become increasingly committed. Guides assess their group’s progress with
increasing scrutiny. Joan’s clients were strong and in good spirits, so the group
pushed on, following a line of bamboo markers that the USFS snow rangers
had installed the day before.
The winter route soon breaks the treeline, a common destination and
turn-around point. When the predominant northwest winds are blowing,
this is where the mountaineer first senses a significant increase in wind speed
as a result of exposure. Small undulations in terrain provide changes in wind
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dynamics on the climb up to the Lion Head, where the winds rage. Climbers
can usually find a reprieve in the nooks between the boulders. The southeast
side of the exposed knob provides some of the best shelter, but just around
the corner, the ground falls away toward Hermit Lake. It was around this area
where, in February 1996, Donald Cote slipped or tripped in strong winds and
fell 350 feet to his death.
Joan’s crew was feeling strong. The two clients were enjoying their climb
and seemed largely unfazed by the conditions. Joan had already told them that
she had an established 2 p.m. turn-around time, and they realized that their
chances of making it to the summit were slim. Nonetheless, they decided to
give it a shot, and the three set off across the edge of the Alpine Garden where
the lack of topographical relief made the going tough. Snow filled the air
and a steady wind was at their right cheeks. Joan used a compass to navigate
through the Southeastern Snowfields where all the cairns were buried and the
trail vanished. As they climbed higher, the wind became too much to handle.
Joan kept pushing up her jacket to look at her watch, and by the time she had
made the call to turn around, her wrist felt exceptionally cold.
The three shot a back bearing, but the wind pushed them off course just
as it had on their ascent through the same area. Joan recognized their error
and tried to correct their course. With the limited visibility of snow blowing,
nothing looked familiar, and she second-guessed herself. The wind was
pushing them to the southeast toward Tuckerman Ravine where the Mount
Washington Avalanche Center had forecasted high avalanche danger, and the
terrain around them became increasingly steep. Joan decided to backtrack
and then perform a sweeping search of the area looking for cairns or some
indication that they were going the right way. The clients became upset,
though she tried to explain her strategy. Then her glove blew away. Joan’s
clients lobbied for her to activate the SPOT, and after deliberation, she agreed.
The device was frozen over from the blowing snow and she couldn’t push the
buttons. Things immediately became more desperate, and Joan used her ice
ax to depress the emergency button and activate a distress signal. While the
rescue was coming to life, Joan and her clients contoured back to the northeast
and eventually found a cairn. As soon as they found it, Joan recognized her
settings and pushed the “I’m OK" button on her SPOT, effectively calling off
the rescue.
Comment: According to the National Association for Search and Rescue,
more than 50,000 SAR missions are initiated each year in the United States.
Many of these are false alarms. Because she used the SPOT, she could call off
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her rescue, but most other devices use COSPAS-SARSAT, the international
Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking System. Once initiated, a distress
signal sent through COSPAS-SARSAT cannot be called off. The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has operated the system for more
than 20 years, and the long-term data suggests that for every real distress call,
there are seven false alarms. The greater the number of false alarms, the more
likely that rescuers will react to PLB calls as to little boys crying wolf. One
of the real advantages of the SPOT, therefore, is that it can call off the rescue
when it’s no longer needed.
Although the devices using COSPAS-SARSAT follow an established phone
tree based on the area, the SPOT is quite different. Rather than relying on
the government-owned satellites as the other devices do, the SPOT uses the
privately owned Globalstar satellite system best known for the satellite phone
service it supplies in the most remote parts of the earth. Joan’s distress call
was sent to the International Emergency Response Coordination Center in
Houston, Texas. At the center, a private company coordinates the notification
stage of the rescue. The local agency with SAR responsibilities (either NHFG
or the Maine Warden Service in the White Mountains) is notified, as are the
two contacts the SPOT device’s owner listed when activating it. Most of the
time, the contact would likely be your mother, spouse, or good friend; for
Joan, it was the climbing school. Her co-workers made a direct call to the
USFS snow rangers, which was faster than routing the call through the official
channels. At one point, the operator from the center in Houston called the
Mount Washington State Park, which is staffed by one person all winter. They
reached the janitor. They tried to persuade him to go outside and have a look
because the distress signal coordinates were fairly close to the summit. He
declined, based on the hurricane-force winds and subzero temperatures. The
operator hung up and called someone else.
Joan suffered frostbite from her ordeal with the most severe patch on her
wrist where she had repeatedly exposed skin while looking at her watch. In
arctic conditions such as the group saw, bare skin will freeze in less than a
minute. To operate in this type of environment, a climber must be outfitted
with a hat and gloves and a facemask and goggles as well. When your body
is sealed within this envelope of gear, the experience can be surreal as your
calm contrasts the chaos of the world around you. As soon as something
goes wrong, however, the chaos tears into your world. In a millisecond, your
glove or goggles could blow away. If you’re carrying extra gloves, you’ll still
have to battle the wind while quickly extracting the items from your pack.
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Try doing this with a bare, shivering hand in less than 60 seconds, and don’t
forget about the risk of losing something else while you’re at it. I rarely use the
keeper strings on my gloves but they’re a good piece of insurance.
Joan was operating at the edge with two strong clients and was confident
in her skills and judgment. She pushed higher than anyone else on the mountain that day but became lost when low visibility and high winds led her off
course. Joan tried to use her compass to navigate, but the strong winds kept
pushing her off a straight line. A GPS might have allowed her to record a
track to follow back, but most units don’t appreciate subzero temperatures.
Instead, Joan used her knowledge of the terrain to recognize how they were
off course and headed for dangerous avalanche terrain. Almost a foot of new
snow had fallen in the past two days, and the snow rangers had rated the
avalanche danger in Tuckerman Ravine as high. The wind wanted to blow the
climbers into the same area as it was blowing the snow, and Joan realized that
they were too far to the south, near the rim of the ravine. She wisely climbed
back up and away from the steep slopes. The snow rangers recorded evidence
of avalanche activity on a wide variety of slopes that day, including those
similar to the area from which Joan backed away.

Unplanned Bivy
On March 26, 2010, experienced hiker Julie H., 61, of Milton, Massachusetts,
began a climb of 4,052-foot Mount Jackson. She started early in what was
supposed to be the most favorable part of the day, but that’s not saying much.
The temperature was right around zero when she set off, and clouds rolled in
and out of the forest on moderate winds. A windchill advisory was in force,
and cold Canadian air was forecasted to pour in on strong northwest winds
later in the afternoon. Julie was well prepared for these conditions, but she had
no desire to stick around for the evening, when temperatures were expected
to fall well below zero and wind speeds would push toward 100 mph.
Mount Jackson ranks 38th on the New Hampshire 4,000-footer list and
is a popular hike because of the views from its open, ledgy summit. The 5.2mile round-trip typically takes hikers about five hours when trail conditions
are good, but it can be slow and hard to navigate when the trail has not been
broken. The area on Mount Jackson above treeline is not expansive, but the
vistas would make you think otherwise. This same openness is what gave Julie
problems when she tried to navigate back down after reaching the summit
in the early afternoon. Julie had little problem on the ascent, and when she
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left the summit, she had two groups descending about 20 minutes ahead of
her. Blowing snow filled the air, and she was unable to find where they had
disappeared into the forest on the trail. Their tracks were long gone, and
the more she looked, the more confused she became. The Jackson Branch of
the Webster-Jackson Trail descends almost due west off the summit, but she
had mistakenly followed part of the Webster Cliff Trail to the south before
losing it.
Julie found a protected spot and used her cell phone to call a friend and
let her know that she was lost not far from the summit. Her next call was at
2:45 p.m. to the AMC down at the Highland Center in Crawford Notch where
she asked if anyone was available to show her the way back to the trail. Once
Julie made this call for help, the SAR ball began rolling. A series of phone
calls ensued until NHFG was officially notified at 3:40 p.m. After acquiring
some information from Julie, they instructed her to call 911. This allowed cell
towers to begin locking in on her phone’s location. Unfortunately, a strong
lock could not be made so rescuers had little to go on other than that she
had only walked 15 minutes down from the summit in what she believed was
the direction of the trail. Rescuers shouldered their gear and read the same
weather report from the Mount Washington Observatory that Julie had access
to at the AMC’s Highland Center in Crawford Notch. The report read:
The most significant danger above tree line today will be lack of visibility. Due to the amount of newly fallen powder being blown about
by strong winds, very little in the way of contrast can be expected.
As a result, it will be extremely easy to become disoriented if venturing above tree line. Take extreme caution and be advised that winds
will rapidly increase this afternoon, exacerbating an already dangerous
situation.
	NHFG conservation officers and volunteers from the AMC SAR team
searched the Webster-Jackson Trail up to and around the summit that
evening. Julie was able to stay in contact with the rescue organizers periodically via cell phone, but she did not see any of those who were looking
for her on the mountain. It is little surprise, however, because the searchers
reported conditions so poor that they couldn’t see each other unless they were
almost holding hands. After exposing themselves to the harsh conditions long
enough to make a rough sweep of the trail side of the summit cone, they
retreated at midnight.
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Julie spent a frigid night in an open bivouac and routinely moved around
to circulate blood and stay warm. She paced back and forth and did jumping
jacks through the morning hours. Temperatures hung just below freezing and
gusts of wind greater than 100 mph whipped the air into a snow-filled frenzy.
When the sun rose, the conditions were still too harsh, and she remained
hunkered in her protected spot. Rescuers from the AMC, MRS, and AVSAR
accompanied NHFG conservation officers up the trail while a New Hampshire
Army National Guard helicopter began a search from the air. Just before
10 a.m., the helicopter crew spotted Julie on the southwest side of the summit
cone and confirmed that she was alive and ambulatory. Ground forces were
just arriving in the area, and the flight crew directed them to her location.
When rescuers reached her, they were impressed at how well she weathered
the conditions. After a quick bite to eat and some warm liquid, the entire
group regained the trail and descended to the trailhead, which they reached
at 12:30 p.m.
Comment: Julie’s ordeal immediately brought questions about whether
she would be considered negligent and billed for the cost of her rescue.
On the one hand, she set off by herself with a destination above treeline
when the forecast explicitly called for dangerous and unforgiving conditions.
Windchills were forecast to be off the chart, so she had little room for error.
Although Julie said that she was fine when they found her, it was already
10 a.m., and she hadn’t tried to descend. If she had been physically capable,
she could have climbed back to the summit, shot a bearing to the west, and
followed it to where her trail entered the treeline. The problem was she didn’t
carry a compass.
	On the other hand, Julie was experienced and carried the rest of the proper
equipment such as plastic double boots, snowshoes, and plenty of warm
clothes. When she became lost, she called the AMC asking for a little help.
She didn’t want an official rescue for fear that she may be charged. She was
cold, tired, and hungry, but she was willing to wait until the storm died down
and visibility improved. Recognizing how atrocious the conditions were and
given a deteriorating weather forecast, the NHFG officers convinced her that
they should rescue her. I have to agree. Sure, she could have survived with her
good attitude, excellent fitness, and proper gear. The problem was that if anything went wrong, she would surely perish. The incident commander had to
assume that she suffered some level of hypothermia in those conditions. The
first thing affected by a drop in body temperature is the brain—coordination
and judgment. Julie had misjudged her abilities in the first place, thereby
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creating her predicament, and another lapse in judgment could have had fatal
consequences. A rescue was definitely warranted.
	Since 1999, when legislation first authorized the state of New Hampshire
to recover search-and-rescue costs, authorities have billed for fewer than
5 percent of missions. The few times they have billed flood the news, perhaps
obscuring how rare this practice is. For the state to charge Julie, it would have
had to argue that she was negligent in attempting her itinerary under the
forecasted conditions with the gear that she carried. Not bringing navigation
equipment is a potentially fatal error, and NHFG recommended that the
state seek to recover some of the $7,471 incurred from the rescue. To date, the
state has not followed that recommendation.
	In 2010, NHFG billed a total of $9,891 for five SAR missions. This was
down from the $43,388 the state billed for ten missions in 2009, although it
subtracted $26,000 of that when it canceled charges against Scott Mason’s
family in that publicized 2009 search for an Eagle Scout from Halifax,
Massachusetts. (See Appalachia, Winter/Spring 2011.) A committee is reviewing many proposals to determine equitable and sustainable ways to fund the
program. Stay tuned.
—Justin J. Preisendorfer
Accidents Editor
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“I started reading Appalachia for the accident reports, but I kept
reading for the great features.” — Mohamed Ellozy, subscriber
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